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Doctrine in a Post-Afoa II State 
Caroline Aubry Golshan* 
ABSTRACT 
Under the nondelegable duty doctrine, a person or entity who has a 
duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others 
and who maintains a right of control over workplace safety is subject to 
liability for harm caused by the failure of a sub-contractor to provide such 
safeguards or precautions. This doctrine is based on the policy that the 
party with the greatest power over work conditions is in the best position 
to implement safety measures across a complex and layered worksite. This 
doctrine has existed in Washington State for decades until the recent 
Washington Supreme Court decision Afoa v. Port of Seattle, when the 
court was faced with determining whether the duty survived Washington’s 
tort reform statutes abrogating joint and several liability. While the court 
ultimately concluded that the nondelegable duty doctrine does not survive 
Washington’s tort reform statute absent an additional finding of agency, 
this Note provides a thorough analysis into the court’s reasoning, com-
pares the reasoning with other jurisdictions faced with similar issues, and 
concludes that Afoa v. Port of Seattle was wrongly decided. The nondele-
gable duty doctrine should have been found to survive Washington’s tort 
reform legislation because it is rooted in principles of agency; therefore, 
an explicit additional finding of agency by a trier of fact is redundant and 
will have lasting consequences on workplace safety in complex worksites. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Washington State, multiemployer worksites, such as airports and 
construction sites, are vast productions with multiple layers of employees. 
As with any complex worksite with multiple moving parts and players, 
safety is an obvious concern. But who should face liability for workplace 
injuries? For decades in Washington, the party with the right of control 
over work conditions was said to have a nondelegable duty1 to provide a 
safe workplace.2 This meant that the duty to provide a safe workplace 
could not be delegated to any other party, and the duty holder is liable for 
any injuries that take place as a result of failing to adhere to proper safety 
measures.3 In many cases, this ended up being the property owner or 
general contractor. The policy behind this doctrine was that the party with 
the greatest power over work conditions was in the best position to 
implement safety measures across a complex and layered worksite. 
However, in a recent decision by the Washington Supreme Court, Afoa v. 
Port of Seattle, the court changed the rule on nondelegable duties by 
holding that, absent an additional finding of agency, the nondelegable duty 
doctrine is inconsistent with Washington’s tort reform statute abrogating 
joint and several liability in most contexts.4 
The case that caused this change in law began in 2007, when Brandon 
Afoa was severely injured during the course of his employment at Seattle–
Tacoma International Airport (Sea–Tac Airport).5 Afoa instituted a third-
party recovery action against the Port of Seattle (Port), the owner of the 
premises where he was injured, but not against his direct employer.6 The 
Port asserted an “empty chair defense,” arguing that the airlines that 
contracted with Afoa’s employer shared fault for Afoa’s injuries.7 After 
trial, the jury found that the Port retained a right of control over Afoa’s 
work conditions, giving rise to a nondelegable duty, and it assessed 
liability of 0.2% to the plaintiff, 25% to the Port, and 74.8% split equally 
between the four airlines. Both parties appealed.8 At the court of appeals, 
                                                     
 1. Some authorities spell this word as “non-delegable.” While some quotations within this article 
use this spelling, the author will consistently use the spelling “nondelegable.” 
 2. See Henning v. Crosby Group, Inc., 802 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1991); Stute v. PB.M.C., Inc., 788 
P.2d 545 (Wash. 1990); George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard Chapman Plumbing & Heating Inc., 836 P.2d 
851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Doss v. ITT Ravonier Inc., 803 P.2d 4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); Gregory J. 
Duff, Job Site Safety in Washington: Requiring Actual Control When Imposing Statutory Duties on 
Job Site Owners, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 355, 355–57 (1994). 
 3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 4. Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Afoa II), 421 P.3d 903, 915 (Wash. 2018).  
 5. Id. at 906–07. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 908. 
 8. Id. at 909. It is noteworthy that, had the jury not assessed 0.2% liability to Mr. Afoa, he would 
have been able to recover the full verdict against the Port under Revised Code of Washington section 
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the court reversed the allocation of liability, concluding that because the 
jury had specifically concluded that the Port retained a right of control over 
Afoa’s work conditions, it had a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe 
workspace, and its fault could not be allocated to the four airlines.9 
However, in a subsequent appeal10 to the Washington Supreme 
Court, decided in July 2018, the court held that the court of appeals’ ruling 
was inconsistent with Revised Code of Washington section 
4.22.070(1)(a), which abolished joint and several liability for concurrent 
negligence.11 Therefore, the court held that the Port was not vicariously 
liable for the fault of the airlines, despite its nondelegable duty status; it 
was only required to pay damages for its allocated liability.12 In order to 
find the Port vicariously liable, the plaintiff had to establish a principal–
agent relationship in accordance with the statute. Although this is a 
question of fact for the jury to decide, the plaintiff failed to make any 
agency arguments until after the verdict, waiving his opportunity to raise 
this issue on appeal.13 A strong dissent pointed out a major problem with 
this ruling—that a nondelegable duty would now essentially be delegable, 
thus defeating the purpose of a nondelegable duty designation and erasing 
decades of precedent of protecting injured workers in this context.14 
The crux of the Afoa litigation is whether the traditional 
nondelegable duty doctrine was eliminated through Washington State’s 
tort reform measures. Specifically, whether the enactment of Revised 
Code of Washington section 4.22.070 eliminated or changed the 
nondelegable duty doctrine. This Note tackles this inquiry in four parts. 
Part I discusses the litigation history of the Afoa cases and the competing 
majority and dissenting opinions. Part II reviews the history of 
Washington State tort reform and the nondelegable duty doctrine. Part III 
provides a comparative analysis of other jurisdictions and how they have 
addressed similar conflicts between nondelegable duties and tort reform 
statutes. Part IV concludes the article with the opinion that the 
nondelegable duty doctrine is compatible with Washington’s tort reform 
statute because, just as vicarious liability arises from agency relationships, 
the nondelegable duty doctrine similarly arises from agency relationships. 
                                                     
4.22.070(1)(b), which allows for joint and several liability when the Plaintiff has no fault. Therefore, 
because he was assessed 0.2% liability, he ultimately lost 74.8% of his verdict. Respondent Brandon 
Afoa’s Motion for Reconsideration at 25, Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903 (2018) (No. 94525-0). For more 
information on joint and several liability, see REV. CODE WASH. § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1993). 
 9. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 909. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 910. 
 12. Id. at 915. 
 13. Id. at 911. 
 14. Id. at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
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Therefore, the ultimate result of Afoa II is a complete change of the 
nondelegable duty doctrine, and it creates additional, unnecessary 
obstacles for injured workers to obtain justice and relief that are contrary 
to public policy. 
I. LITIGATION HISTORY OF AFOA 
In 2007, Brandon Afoa was injured during the course of his 
employment while working at Sea–Tac Airport.15 Afoa’s employer was 
Evergreen Aviation Ground Logistics Enterprises Inc. (EAGLE), which 
contracts with airlines to provide ground services, such as loading and 
unloading.16 Afoa was driving a “pushback” vehicle on an airline ramp 
toward gate S-16 when he lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a 
large piece of loading equipment that then fell on him.17 The loss of control 
of the vehicle was allegedly due to a mechanical failure, and the collision 
rendered Afoa paralyzed.18 He obtained some recovery through 
Washington’s Workers’ Compensation system, and he also brought a 
third-party action to obtain relief from the wrongful parties.19 
A. Afoa I 
In 2009, Afoa sued the Port, which owns and operates Sea–Tac 
Airport, on the basis that it failed to maintain a safe premises, it violated 
common law, and it breached statutory duties to maintain a safe 
workplace.20 Afoa sought recovery based on three theories: (1) as a 
business invitee; (2) for breach of safety regulations under the Washington 
Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), chapter 49.17 of the 
Revised Code of Washington; and (3) the duty of a general contractor to 
maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors.21 
Afoa alleged that the Port controlled the manner in which he 
performed his work at Sea–Tac Airport; therefore, it should be liable 
despite the fact that the Port was not his direct employer.22 In support of 
this theory, Afoa claimed the following: 
                                                     
 15. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 393 P.3d 802, 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
 16. Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Afoa I), 296 P.3d 800, 804 (Wash. 2013).  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Washington’s legislature provides for third-party actions if a third party is liable. REV. CODE. 
WASH. § 51.24.030(1) (1995). “The Legislature evidences a strong policy in favor of actions against 
third parties by assigning the cause of action to the Department of Labor and Industries if the workman 
elects not to bring a third party suit.” Evans v. Thompson, 879 P.2d 938, 939 (Wash. 1994). 
 20. Afoa I, 296 P.3d at 804. 
 21. Id. at 803. 
 22. Id. at 804. 
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First, he claims the Port retains control over the “Airfield Area” 
(where the accident allegedly took place) in its lease agreement with 
the airlines, which grants the airlines use of the Airfield Area “subject 
at all times to the exclusive control and management by the 
Port.” . . . . Second, Afoa claims the Port retains control through its 
license agreement with EAGLE, which requires EAGLE to abide by 
all Port rules and regulations and allows the Port to inspect EAGLE’s 
work. The agreement also disclaims liability for accidents and 
equipment malfunctions. Finally, Afoa claims the Port retains control 
over EAGLE by the Port’s conduct. He specifically claims that the 
Port continuously controls and supervises the actions of EAGLE and 
its employees and that the Port previously asserted control over 
tug/pushback brake maintenance following an incident that was 
similar to, and three months before, Afoa’s accident.23 
In 2013, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary 
judgment for the Port.24 The court held that there were genuine issues of 
material fact as to preclude a grant of summary judgment, and the case 
could proceed. Specifically, it held that Afoa’s premises liability claim 
was potentially viable because Afoa was a business invitee.25 The court 
also held that Afoa may have a potentially viable WISHA claim because 
jobsite owners have a statutory duty to prevent WISHA violations if they 
retain control over work done on a jobsite.26 Such a duty does not depend 
on the existence of a direct employment agreement.27 Furthermore, the 
court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the 
Port retained sufficient control over EAGLE and Afoa that it acquired the 
duty to prevent WISHA violations.28 Finally, the court held that the Port 
may have had a duty to maintain safe common work areas under the 
common law safe workplace doctrine, which states that landowners and 
general contractors that retain control over a work site have a duty to 
maintain safe common work areas.29 The case was remanded to superior 
court for further proceedings where it progressed to trial and subsequent 
appeals, entitled Afoa II. 
                                                     
 23. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 24. Id. at 803. 
 25. Afoa I, 296 P.3d at 804–05. 
 26. Id. at 806. 
 27. Id. at 807. 
 28. Id. at 808. 
 29. The common law safe workplace doctrine will be referred to in this Note as the nondelegable 
duty doctrine. See id. at 808 (citing Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 582 P.2d 500, 505–06 
(Wash. 1978); Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 52 P.3d 472, 475–76 (Wash. 2002)). 
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B. Afoa II 
At trial, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Afoa and assessed his 
damages at $40 million.30 The jury found that the Port retained control 
over EAGLE’s work, which gave rise to a nondelegable duty.31 However, 
the Port asserted an empty chair defense, which allowed the jury to allocate 
damages to the non-party airlines that used EAGLE’s services under 
comparative negligence standards.32 The jury allocated 25% fault to the 
Port and 18.7% fault to each of the airlines, resulting in a judgment against 
the Port for only $10 million of the $40 million assessed damages. Both 
parties appealed.33 
The Port’s appeal focused on the phrasing of question 1 in the special 
verdict form, which asked the jury whether the Port retained a right to 
control the manner in which EAGLE “performed its work or maintained 
its equipment used to provide ground work support.”34 Afoa’s appeal 
argued that the jury should have been precluded from allocating fault to 
the four airlines because the Port had a nondelegable duty to maintain a 
safe workplace.35 The court of appeals held that the special verdict 
question 1 was not erroneous because both the common law theory of 
retained control and the WISHA “specific” duty standard depend on 
control over the manner of work done on a worksite.36 The court of appeals 
also concluded that the Port had a nondelegable duty to ensure a safe 
workplace, including safe equipment, and as such, it was vicariously liable 
for any breach of that duty.37 The Supreme Court of Washington granted 
review of the case to address the issue of allocation of fault to the nonparty 
airlines and Afoa’s contingent issues concerning the Port’s assertion of an 
empty chair defense.38 
In its review of the case, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned 
that the Tort Reform Act of 1986 abrogated the common law rule of joint 
and several liability, and that Revised Code of Washington section 
4.22.070 requires all liability to be apportioned unless a listed exception 
                                                     
 30. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 393 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
 31. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 916 (Wash. 2018) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Special Verdict Form at 
1, Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 09-2-06657-4 (Wash. Super. Ct., Mar. 31, 2015), 2015 WL 1911587. 
 32. In 2010, Afoa filed a separate suit against the four airlines that used EAGLE’s ground 
services. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and then dismissed after the court denied Afoa’s 
motion to add the Port of Seattle. The federal court concluded that Afoa failed to show the airlines 
were at fault and granted the airlines summary judgment in February and June 2014. Afoa, 393 P.3d 
at 806. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; Special Verdict Form, supra note 31, at 1.  
 35. Afoa, 393 P.3d at 808. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 915 (Wash. 2018). 
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applies.39 Common law vicarious liability is one of the statute’s 
exceptions, but the court stated that it would only apply if the jury made 
the necessary finding of control, which did not happen in this case.40 
The court reasoned that while principles of common law survive 
Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070, there is no clearly 
established common law right to hold tortfeasors with a nondelegable duty 
vicariously liable for another entity’s breach of the same duty.41 The court 
admitted that no delegation occurred here. In addition, simply because the 
Port cannot delegate its responsibility does not mean it must adopt the 
responsibility of another.42 There is a common law duty to provide a safe 
workplace in Washington, which is why the Port was directly liable in this 
case; however, the Port could only be vicariously liable for the airlines’ 
breach of their nondelegable duties if a jury found that the Port retained 
control over the airlines.43 The jury was not presented with this specific 
question.44 The jury only found that the Port retained control over 
EAGLE.45 
For these reasons, the court concluded that a nondelegable duty does 
not supersede fault allocation under Revised Code of Washington section 
4.22.070, and the jury did not find facts that would justify applying the 
statute’s agency exception.46 A party is only responsible for the fault of 
another person where both were acting in concert or when a person was 
acting as an agent or servant of the other party.47 Because the jury did not 
directly answer the question of agency, no exception applied. The 
Washington Supreme Court, in a 5–4 ruling, reversed the court of appeals’ 
decision and reinstated the trial court’s apportioned award.48 
At this point, the majority’s reasoning seems relatively sound: the 
Port cannot be responsible for another entity’s concurrent liability unless 
the Port retained control over the other entities, such that the airlines were 
acting as agents or servants of the Port. Because the jury did not directly 
address the amount of control the Port had over the airlines, there was no 
finding that the airlines were agents or servants of the Port. Therefore, the 
Port’s “nondelegable duty” is limited to its apportioned liability. This is 
                                                     
 39. Id. at 908. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 915. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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consistent with the policy reasons supporting the Tort Reform Act and the 
goal of assessing liability based on a party’s apportioned negligence.49 
However, while trying to understand the majority’s reasoning, the 
purpose of the application of the nondelegable duty designation remains 
unclear. If the Port has a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe workplace, 
which the trial court essentially found, the majority’s reasoning renders 
that designation obsolete because the Port’s nondelegable duty as a jobsite 
owner at a multiemployer site is apportioned—or delegated—to the 
airlines. In Justice Debra Stephens’s dissenting opinion, she astutely 
points out that “[t]he majority’s contrary holding renders the nondelegable 
duty doctrine meaningless.”50 While the implications of this holding are 
not yet known, it is clear that some change or modification of the rule took 
place, whether intentional or not. The result is either an elimination of the 
nondelegable duty doctrine altogether or a revision of the doctrine’s 
elements. 
C. Afoa II Dissent 
The dissent struggled to grapple with the majority’s reasoning. In a 
perplexed opinion, the dissent pointed out that “the majority’s recognition 
that [Revised Code of Washington section] 4.22.070(1)(a) preserves joint 
and several liability when a defendant owes a nondelegable duty should 
end the matter.”51 If the Port is not held vicariously liable for the safety 
breaches that caused Afoa’s injuries, then the Port’s duty is no longer 
nondelegable; it becomes something else.52 
Under the common law safe workplace doctrine, if the employer 
retains control over some part of the independent contractor’s work, the 
employer owes a nondelegable duty within the scope of that control to 
provide a reasonably safe workplace.53 The origin of the common law safe 
workplace doctrine is rooted in “master–servant” agency principles, but 
over time, the courts have expanded the doctrine beyond simply a master-
servant relationship.54 In another Washington Supreme Court case,55 the 
court held that the existence of a safe workplace duty depends on retained 
control over work, not on labels or contractual designations such as 
                                                     
 49. Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 75 P.3d 497, 506 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, 
J., dissenting) (citing Godfrey v. State, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1975)). 
 50. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 916 (citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 788 P.2d 545, 548 (Wash. 1990); Kennedy v. Sea-
land Serv., Inc., 816 P.2d 75, 81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 54. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 55. Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 52 P.3d 472 (Wash. 2002). 
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independent contractor or general contractor.56 Indeed, the court held that 
when an entity retains control over the manner in which work is done on 
a worksite, that entity has a duty to keep common work areas safe because 
it is in the best position to prevent harm to workers.57 For example, 
“[w]here a licensor undertakes to control worker safety in a large, complex 
work site like Sea–Tac Airport and is in the best position to control safety, 
there is a duty to maintain safe common work areas within the scope of 
retained control.”58 These principles, as held in Afoa I and consistently 
throughout Washington jurisprudence, support the conclusion that the Port 
owed a nondelegable duty to maintain safe common work areas. 
The dissent further concluded that the Port owed a statutory 
nondelegable duty to ensure WISHA compliance. In Afoa I, the court 
confirmed that jobsite owners have a duty to comply with WISHA only if 
they retain control over the manner in which contractors complete their 
work, and if a jobsite owner retains control over the manner and 
instrumentalities of work being done on the jobsites, the owner has a 
nondelegable duty to all workers on the jobsite to comply with WISHA 
regulations.59 The Afoa I court held that if the jury determined the Port 
retained a right to control the manner in which Afoa’s employer performed 
its work or maintained safe conditions, the Port owed a nondelegable 
specific duty under WISHA.60 
Liability under the WISHA specific nondelegable duty doctrine 
results in vicarious liability because a control party, such as the Port, bears 
the primary responsibility for compliance with safety regulations. 61 
Similarly, on construction sites, the general contractor’s supervisory 
authority places it in the best position to ensure WISHA compliance for 
the safety of all workers; therefore, the general contractor is considered 
the primary employer and has, as a matter of policy, the duty to comply 
with or ensure compliance with WISHA.62 According to Justice Stephens, 
Afoa met his burden to establish the Port’s common law and statutory 
nondelegable duty by proving to the jury that the Port retained a right of 
control over worksite safety conditions, including safe maintenance of the 
vehicle he was driving when he was injured.63 
                                                     
 56. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing Afoa I, 296 P.3d 800, 817 (Wash. 
2013)). 
 57. Id. (citing Afoa I, 296 P.3d at 804). 
 58. Id. at 918. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 916 (citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 788 P.2d 545, 551 (Wash. 1990)). 
 62. Id. at 919. 
 63. Id. at 915. 
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The jury’s verdict found that the Port retained the right to control the 
manner in which Afoa’s employer, EAGLE, performed its work and 
maintained its equipment. The jury also found that the combined 
negligence of the Port, the nonparty airlines, and Afoa proximately caused 
Afoa’s injuries.64 The jury answered “yes” to question 1 on the specific 
verdict form which asked the jury whether the Port retained a right to 
control the manner in which Afoa’s employer, EAGLE, performed its 
work or maintained its equipment used to provide ground support work 
for the non-party air carriers.65 Therefore, Justice Stephens argues, the 
verdict is dispositive of three things: “(1) the Port retained a right of 
control to ensure compliance with safety standards in the workplace, (2) 
the Port therefore owed a nondelegable common law and WISHA specific 
duty to Afoa, and, as a result, (3) the Port is directly and vicariously liable 
for Afoa’s injuries.”66 The dissent concluded as follows: 
[T]he Port’s control over the work site is sufficiently analogous to 
that of a general contractor to support the nondelegable duty theory 
of vicarious liability. As a result, the Port, no less than a general 
contractor, is not only directly liable for its own negligence but also 
vicariously liable for safety breaches of others.67 
In rejecting the majority’s theory of multiple nondelegable duties, the 
dissent points out that there is no jury finding that the airlines retained 
control over Afoa’s work conditions, only a finding that the Port retained 
control.68 The fact that there may be concurrent duties at a multiemployer 
worksite is unremarkable because the Port’s workplace safety duty is seen 
as prime or primary.69 Only the Port, not the airlines, is analogous to a 
general contractor because “[t]he Port operates a major airport facility, is 
responsible for its own employees, and allows controlled access to 
thousands of employees of other employers.”70 The Port owed a common 
law and statutory specific duty to maintain workplace safety without 
regard to whether others at the worksite, including the airlines, also owed 
a duty.71 
The dissent next addressed the majority’s argument that Revised 
Code of Washington section 4.22.070 abrogated vicarious liability in this 
situation. Even after the enactment of the statute, joint and several liability 
                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 920. 
 67. Id. at 921. 
 68. Id. at 922. 
 69. Id. (citing Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 912 P.2d 472, 479 (Wash. 
1996)). 
 70. Id. at 919 (citing Afoa I, 296 P.3d 800, 814 (Wash. 2013)). 
 71. Id. 
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remains appropriate in certain situations. As stated within the statute, “[a] 
party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for payment of 
the proportionate share of another party where both were acting in concert 
or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.”72 
Therefore, this case becomes an issue of statutory interpretation and 
whether the phrase “acting as an agent or servant” encompasses the 
historical development of agency law beyond the initial master–servant 
context to include the nondelegable duty.73 The majority rejected the 
Port’s argument that the statute should be read to preserve joint and several 
liability only in master–servant or principal–agent relationships; however, 
it held that, in order to invoke joint and several liability premised on the 
nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, there must be proof of a 
direct agency relationship.74 The dissent rejected this interpretation 
because vicarious liability under the nondelegable duty doctrine arises 
from the same principles as vicarious liability in traditional agency 
relationships.75 Therefore, the nondelegable duty doctrine—as a form of 
vicarious liability recognized in agency law—is encompassed within the 
traditional joint and several liability retained in Revised Code of 
Washington section 4.22.070(1)(a).76 
The dissent concluded with a warning of the devastating effects of 
the majority’s holding: its interpretation of Revised Code of Washington 
section 4.22.070(1)(a) essentially destroys the workplace safety doctrine 
and will result in general contractors and jobsite owners passing off 
liability to subcontractors and others who commit safety breaches; this is 
a step backward from Washington’s recognition that the nondelegable 
duty doctrine is intended to “place the safety burden on the entity in the 
best position to ensure a safe working environment.”77 
II. HISTORY OF WASHINGTON STATE TORT REFORM AND 
NONDELEGABLE DUTIES 
This section provides a brief historical overview of Washington State 
law as it pertains to the issues addressed in the Afoa litigation, as well as 
                                                     
 72. Id. at 915 (majority opinion) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1993)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 923 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15, topic 
2, intro. note at 394 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (nondelegability rules, which arise out of some relation 
toward the public or the particular plaintiff, “are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer liable 
for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective of whether the employer has himself 
been at fault”)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 924. 
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the compatibility of Washington’s Tort Reform Act with the nondelegable 
duty doctrine. 
A. Washington State’s Tort Reform Act 
In the 1980s, a sweep of tort reform took place across the United 
States, fueled primarily by a crisis in the cost and availability of liability 
insurance.78 Public polls showed that very few Americans supported the 
underlying premise of joint and several liability, and many state 
legislatures passed legislation in response.79 Many Americans considered 
tort reform essential to reduce the debilitating financial consequences to a 
single, and perhaps undeserving, defendant when other defendants are 
unable to afford a judgment. In the 1980s, multiple states adopted tort 
reform legislation introducing comparative negligence standards and 
abrogating joint and several liability.80 In 1986, Washington State’s 
legislature passed the Tort Reform Act with the same objectives. 
The preamble to Washington’s Tort Reform Act states that its 
purpose, in part, is to “enact further reforms in order to create a more 
equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the 
availability and affordability of insurance.”81 In essence, the goal of 
Washington’s Tort Reform statute was to create a comparative negligence 
system with the purpose of providing greater fairness to defendants and 
providing a “more complete, workable and effective remedy” for the 
injured plaintiff.82 The Washington Supreme Court described the catalyst 
for the statute’s enactment, noting that “[t]he legislature specifically noted 
                                                     
 78. Marco de Sae Silva, Constitutional Challenges to Washington’s Limit on Noneconomic 
Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and Death, 63 WASH. L. REV. 653, 655–56 (1988). 
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the escalating costs to governmental entities through increased exposure 
to lawsuits, awards, and increased costs of insurance coverage, as well as 
increases in costs in professional liability insurance for physicians and 
other health care providers, and other professionals.”83 The Act furthered 
the reforms, which had begun with the adoption of 
comparative negligence in 1973, by abolishing joint and several liability 
in most situations.84 
Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070 of the Tort Reform 
Act of 1986 is “the centerpiece of the 1986 amendatory package.”85 The 
pertinent portion of this legislation reads, “In all actions involving fault of 
more than one entity,86 the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of 
the total fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the 
claimant’s damages . . . ,” the sum of which shall total 100%.87 This 
provision codified a comparative negligence standard and abolished joint 
and several liability as to multiple defendants, except under certain 
circumstances.88 Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that “the legislature left no doubt as to its intent—proportionate 
liability ‘has now become the rule.’”89 
The legislative text of Revised Code of Washington section 
4.22.070(1)(a) includes three exceptions to the abolition of joint and 
several liability: (1) where the negligent parties were acting in concert or 
where there was a master–servant or principal–agent relationship; (2) in 
cases involving hazardous waste, tortious interference with business, and 
unmarked fungible goods such as asbestos; and (3) where the plaintiff is 
fault-free and judgment has been entered against two or more defendants.90 
The first exception is the focus of this Note because the nondelegable duty 
doctrine is a form of vicarious liability, and they are both forms of an 
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agency relationship. Therefore, the nondelegable duty doctrine is 
encompassed within the first exception, and it is the means to which Afoa 
could have obtained joint and several relief from the Port. 
B. Principles of Agency 
Because of the significance of the principal–agent relationship or 
master–servant relationship,91 Revised Code of Washington section 
4.22.070(1)(a) allows for joint and several liability by holding the 
principal responsible for the fault of the agent and the master responsible 
for the fault of the servant.92 An agent can be defined as “a person 
employed to perform services in the affairs of another under an express or 
implied agreement, and who . . . is subject to the other’s control or right of 
control.”93 “In contrast, an independent contractor may be defined as one 
who contractually undertakes to perform services for another, but who is 
neither controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control.”94 
Whether an agency relationship exists is determined by the trier of 
fact. If the inference is clear that there is or is not a master–servant 
relationship, the court decides the issue; otherwise, the jury determines the 
question after instruction by the court as to the matters of fact to be 
considered.95 
The trier of fact considers multiple factors when assessing whether a 
party is an agent or an independent contractor, including: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
                                                     
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1958).  
The word servant has retained its early significance in cases involving the liability of the 
master to third persons and the common law liability of master and servant. However, in 
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 92. Gregory C. Sick, Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and Several Liability: 
Resisting the Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 109 (1992). 
 93. Chapman v. Black, 741 P.2d 998, 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
 94. Id. 
 95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
2019] Nondelegable Duty Doctrine 335 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, 
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a 
specialist without supervision;  
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing 
the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of 
master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.96 
The factors are of varying importance and all factors need not be 
present. However, all factors relate directly or indirectly to “the crucial 
factor of control or right of control resident in the employer or principal.”97 
The test of control is not about whether the principal actually interferes 
with the work of the agent, but whether the principal holds the right to 
exercise such control over the agent.98 As discussed below, the 
nondelegable duty doctrine creates a form of agency relationship.99 
Because in Afoa the trier of fact—the jury—found that the Port retained a 
right of control over Afoa’s work conditions, a nondelegable duty and an 
agency relationship were created. 
C. The Nondelegable Duty Doctrine 
The history of the nondelegable duty doctrine reflects a policy-based 
expansion of the traditional vicarious liability principles recognized in the 
“master–servant” relationship in agency law.100 As a general rule in 
Washington State, a principal is not liable for injuries caused by an 
independent contractor whose services the principal engages.101 However, 
there is an exception at common law which subjects the principal to 
liability for its contractor’s tortious conduct even if the principal exercised 
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 99. See infra Section II(C). 
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reasonable care.102 This exception gives rise to vicarious liability and is 
nondelegable.103 The Restatement explains this doctrine as follows: 
The [rules] . . . do not rest upon any personal negligence of the 
employer. They are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer 
liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective 
of whether the employer has himself been at fault. They arise in 
situations in which, for reasons of policy, the employer is not 
permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work 
to the contractor. The liability imposed is closely analogous to that of 
a master for the negligence of his servant.104 
The statement commonly made in such cases is that the employer is 
under a duty that he is not free to delegate to the contractor. Such a “non-
delegable duty” requires the person upon whom it is imposed to answer 
for it that care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent 
contractor, to whom the performance of the duty is entrusted.105 
A nondelegable duty can be created by statute or administrative 
regulation.106 Specifically, a party who, under a statute or administrative 
regulation, has a duty to provide “specified safeguards or precautions for 
the safety of others is subject to liability of the others for whose protection 
the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor 
employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”107 In such 
cases, the employer cannot delegate his duty to provide such safeguards or 
precautions to an independent contractor.108 
D. Washington’s Regulations Giving Rise to a Nondelegable Duty 
In Washington, a general contractor, as well as an owner-developer, 
has a nondelegable duty to enforce applicable state and federal safety 
regulations where the contractor or owner exercises authority over the 
safety of the workplace.109 In 1973, the Washington State Legislature 
passed the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA).110 The 
purpose of this Act was to “create, maintain, continue, and enhance the 
industrial safety and health program of the state” and “to assure, insofar as 
may reasonably be possible, safe and healthful working conditions for 
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every man and woman working in the state of Washington . . . .”111 The 
Act was explicitly created in the public interest and for the welfare of 
Washington citizens.112 The pertinent section of WISHA reads as follows: 
Each employer: 
(1) Shall furnish to each of his or her employees a place of 
employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely 
to cause serious injury or death to his or her employees: PROVIDED, 
That no citation or order assessing a penalty shall be issued to any 
employer solely under the authority of this subsection except where 
no applicable rule or regulation has been adopted by the department 
covering the unsafe or unhealthful condition of employment at the 
workplace; and 
(2) Shall comply with the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated 
under this chapter.113 
There is a clear public policy against allowing general contractors to 
delegate or otherwise avoid their responsibility to maintain a safe jobsite 
for all workers. In the construction site scenario, the general contractor is 
believed to bear the primary responsibility for compliance with safety 
regulations because the general contractor’s innate supervisory authority 
constitutes sufficient control over the workplace.114 While courts have 
allowed for general contractors or worksite owners to contract away this 
nondelegable status with an indemnification addendum,115 absent such 
indemnification agreement, liability flows to those who are in a position 
to control the actual implementation of safety standards in the 
workplace.116 The statute created a nondelegable duty on the part of a 
general contractor to provide a safe place of work for employees of 
subcontractors on the jobsite; this duty extended to providing reasonable 
safety equipment where necessary.117 
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Furthermore, under Washington’s regulations, each employer is 
required to furnish to each of their employees “a place of employment free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause serious injury 
or death to their employees.”118 In addition, every employer shall “require 
safety devices, furnish safeguards for employees, and adopt and use 
practices, methods, operations, and processes that are reasonably adequate 
to render such employment and place of employment safe.”119 Every 
employer shall “do everything reasonably necessary to protect the life and 
safety of employees.”120 
Under Washington’s statutes and regulations, principals have a 
nondelegable duty to provide workplace safety when they exert a right of 
control over an agent. In the Afoa case, the jury found that the Port, not the 
airlines, retained a right of control over Afoa’s work conditions;121 
therefore, the Port retained a right to control the manner in which Afoa’s 
employer, EAGLE, performed its work or maintained the equipment used 
to provide ground support work for the non-party air carriers.122 This 
established an agency relationship and a duty that is applicable to the 
nondelegable duty doctrine. 
An agency relationship is formed, and vicarious liability is imposed, 
when a principal exerts a right of control over its agent; this is one of the 
exceptions to Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070’s abolition of 
joint and several liability. The nondelegable duty doctrine, as a form of 
agency, should similarly apply as an exception to the statute. Because the 
nondelegable duty doctrine is rooted in a vicarious liability and agency 
analysis, a finding of an agency relationship triggers joint and several 
liability to the principal. Since the Port has a nondelegable duty to provide 
a safe worksite pursuant to Washington’s statutes and regulations and 
common law, it is subject to joint and several liability as an agency 
exception to Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070. It should not 
be permitted to delegate its liability. 
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO 
NONDELEGABLE DUTIES AND THEIR RESILIENCE IN LIGHT OF TORT 
REFORM 
Other jurisdictions have faced a similar dilemma in determining 
whether their respective tort reform measures affected the longstanding 
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nondelegable duty doctrine and have reached different results.123 While 
none of these cases are entirely analogous to Afoa II, they provide helpful 
insight on how courts in other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues 
relating to nondelegable duties and tort reform legislation that abrogated 
joint and several liability in certain instances. They also demonstrate how 
other jurisdictions determine if the nondelegable duty doctrine can be 
salvaged with a finding of multiple, concurrent nondelegable duties. 
A. Arizona 
In 2000, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on a strikingly similar 
issue yet rendered the opposite ruling than Afoa II. In a wrongful death 
action against the city of Phoenix, the city conceded that it had a 
nondelegable duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition 
but argued that the legislative abolition of joint and several liability 
changed the rule on nondelegable duties.124 The city named Arizona Public 
Service (APS), an independent contractor, as a non-party at fault because 
APS was obligated to operate and maintain streetlights pursuant to a 
contract between APS and the city.125 There was conflicting evidence on 
whether the streetlight was on at the time of the accident, which would 
possibly result in some fault on the part of the independent contractor 
when the plaintiff was hit and killed by an automobile while crossing a 
street.126 
Similar to Washington’s statute, the Arizona statute at issue limited 
joint and several liability to situations where persons are acting in concert 
or where the other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.127 
Because there was no finding that APS was a servant or an agent of the 
city, the city claimed it could not be vicariously liable for the acts of 
APS.128 
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In its analysis, the Arizona Supreme Court noted the policy behind 
the nondelegable duty doctrine is “premised on the principle that certain 
duties of the employer are of such importance that he may not escape 
liability merely by delegating performance to another.”129 
Although there was no explicit finding that the independent 
contractor was a servant or an agent of the city, the court rejected that this 
finding was necessary to find an agency relationship.130 In response to the 
city’s argument, the court astutely noted, “[H]ow can it be that one can 
admit to the existence of a non-delegable duty, but then disclaim liability 
for the non-performance of that duty? The concepts are mutually 
exclusive.”131 
Second, the court noted numerous examples of when an independent 
contractor is considered an agent. Because APS contracted to act on the 
city’s behalf to maintain the streetlights, APS was the city’s agent for the 
performance of that nondelegable duty.132 Where there is a nondelegable 
duty, principals are held liable for the negligence of agents whether the 
agents were an employees or independent contractors.133 
The court ultimately held that when an employer has a nondelegable 
duty, the vicarious liability of that employer is unaffected by Arizona’s 
comparative negligence statute because the one with whom the principal 
contracts to perform that duty is, as a matter of law, always an agent for 
purposes of applying the doctrine of vicarious liability.134 
Following the Arizona Supreme Court’s analysis, because APS was 
the city’s agent for the performance of the nondelegable duty to maintain 
the streetlights, the airlines are similarly the Port of Seattle’s agent for the 
performance of the nondelegable duty to enforce applicable state and 
federal safety regulations.135 Because the jury expressly found that the Port 
exercised control over the safety of the workplace, a determination of 
agency should be encompassed within that finding. Because the Arizona 
court found that the nondelegable duty doctrine survives Arizona’s 
comparative negligence statute when there is an inherent agency 
relationship found, a similar interpretation should have been used in Afoa. 
B. California 
In 1994, California’s appellate court squarely addressed the issue of 
whether California’s Tort Reform Statute, which abrogated joint and 
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several liability, applies where a defendant’s liability is based on a 
nondelegable duty.136 In Srithong, the plaintiff filed a personal injury 
complaint against Total Investment Company (Total), the owner and 
manager of a mini-mall, and Modern Roofing Company (Modern), a 
subcontractor of Total, who was hired to repair leaks on the roof of the 
building.137 When the Modern employees were mopping tar on the roof, 
some substance seeped through the building and fell on the plaintiff, 
causing burns and scarring.138 The trial court found Modern to be 95% at 
fault and Total to be 5% at fault. Total moved to reduce its responsible 
share of noneconomic damages to 5% under the California’s Tort Reform 
Statute, commonly known as Proposition 51, and the court granted the 
motion.139 The plaintiff appealed. 
Proposition 51 stated in pertinent part: 
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful 
death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each 
defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall 
not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of 
non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct 
proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a separate 
judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.140 
While a person who hires an independent contractor is generally not 
liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor’s negligence in 
performing the work, the nondelegable duty doctrine is an exception.141 
Under this doctrine, a landlord cannot escape liability for failure to 
maintain property in a safe condition by delegating such duty to an 
independent contractor.142 In support, the court explained: 
[T]he duty which a possessor of land owes to others to put and 
maintain it in reasonably safe condition is nondelegable. If an 
independent contractor, no matter how carefully selected, is 
employed to perform it, the possessor is answerable for harm caused 
by the negligent failure of his contractor to put or maintain the 
buildings and structures in reasonably safe condition.143 
In Srithong, the court found the nondelegable duty rule advances the 
same purposes as other forms of vicarious liability: to insure that there will 
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be a financially responsible defendant available to compensate for the 
negligent harms caused by that defendant’s activity and to assure that 
when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be 
compensated by the person whose activity caused the harm.144 
The court found a distinction between joint and several liability and 
vicarious liability, reasoning that the California statute addresses the 
doctrine of joint and several liability, not vicarious tort liability, which is 
not based on principles of comparative fault. The court noted, “Unlike the 
doctrine of joint and several liability, vicarious liability is a matter of status 
or relationship, not fault. Thus, where vicarious liability is involved, there 
is no fault to apportion.”145 The nondelegable duty doctrine is a form of 
vicarious liability, so the California statute is inapplicable.146 The court 
held that because the statute did not abrogate vicarious tort liability, 
Proposition 51 did not apply, and Total was fully liable for Modern’s 
negligence.147 
However, in another case in 2011, the Supreme Court of California 
held that duties of care under the California Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (Cal-OSHA) are automatically delegated when a party hires an 
independent contractor.148 The court focused on the definition of 
“employer” that applied to California’s workplace safety laws to support 
its conclusion that employees of independent contractors are not 
considered to be the hirer’s own employees.149 After 1971, the California 
Legislature’s definition of the term “employer” became much more 
narrow.150 Because of the scope of who is considered an employee, the 
court reasoned that defendant US Airways owed its own employees a duty 
to provide a safe workplace, but employees of an independent contractor, 
like Aubry, are not considered to be the hirer’s own employees.151 
The California Supreme Court concluded that when US Airways 
hired the independent contractor, Lloyd W. Aubry Co. (Aubry),152 it 
delegated any duty it owed to Aubry’s employees to comply with the 
safety requirements of Cal-OSHA.153 Ultimately, the court made the broad 
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conclusion that the delegation of any duty is implied as an incident of an 
independent contractor’s hiring, and it includes a duty to identify the 
absence of the safety guards required by Cal-OSHA regulations and to take 
reasonable steps to address that hazard.154 Therefore, when US Airways 
hired independent contractor Aubry to maintain and repair a conveyor belt, 
US Airways presumptively delegated to Aubry any tort law duty of care 
under Cal-OSHA. 
The concurrence found an issue with the majority’s conclusion, 
noting that the majority failed to address the specific question posed on 
appeal and instead adopted a rule broader than any party had proposed—
that an employer’s duties under the Cal-OSHA and the regulations issued 
under its authority are delegable and, moreover, are presumptively 
delegated to independent contractors.155 Essentially, the concurrence—
which reads more like a dissent—took issue with the majority’s analysis. 
While the majority stated there was no clear legislative intent on this 
issue,156 the concurrence responded with the following argument: 
[N]ondelegability is the clear, unavoidable import of section 6400, 
subdivision (b), which confirms that Cal–OSHA authorizes the 
Division of Occupational Safety & Health (DOSH) to issue citations 
to employers at multiemployer worksites when an employee has been 
exposed to a hazard . . . “regardless of whether their own employees 
were exposed to the hazard.”157 
The concurrence also noted that the 1999 amendments to the statutes 
addressing multiemployer worksites left no doubt that the legislature 
understood and intended that any employer’s Cal-OSHA duties would 
extend not only to the employer’s own employees but also those of other 
employers.158 
In sum, the concurrence was not satisfied with the majority’s analysis 
that the legislature intended to treat duties created by Cal-OSHA statutes 
and rules as delegable and presumptively delegated whenever an entity 
who holds such duty hires an independent contractor.159 Such a rule that 
“threatens an erosive effect on workplace safety” should have more solid 
grounding in legislative intent than a statutory definition of an 
employer.160 
                                                     
 154. Id. at 744. 
 155. Id. at 747 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
 156. Id. at 739 n.1 (majority opinion).  
 157. Id. at 747 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. at 748 (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 749. 
 160. Id. 
344 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:321 
These California cases demonstrate how some courts have addressed 
the nondelegable duty doctrine’s viability in light of tort reform measures. 
The Srithong court made a notable point that the nondelegable duty rule 
advances the same purposes of other vicarious liability to ensure that a 
financially responsible defendant will be available to compensate an 
injured party.161 Furthermore, because vicarious liability is a matter of 
status or relationship, not fault, it is similar to the nondelegable duty 
doctrine, which is based on the relationship between the parties and the 
amount of control one party exerts over the other. This conclusion supports 
the contention that the nondelegable duty doctrine should not be 
eliminated or modified from tort reform statutes abolishing joint and 
several liability. The Afoa II court could have reached a similar conclusion 
by determining that because the jury found that the Port maintained control 
over Afoa’s work conditions, an agency relationship was formed with the 
airlines, resulting in a form of vicarious liability. 
The Afoa II court does not go as far as Seabright in concluding that 
statutory and regulatory duties to provide a safe workplace are 
automatically delegated when an independent contractor is hired. Instead, 
the court attempts to preserve the nondelegable duty doctrine only when 
the agency has been expressly found by the trier of fact. However, the 
court’s disposition of the case rendered the same result for Brandon Afoa 
as the Seabright court did and essentially changed the rule of nondelegable 
duties. Now, plaintiffs are required to prove an additional element of 
agency, which, before Afoa II, was inherent in the doctrine itself when a 
right of control was maintained over an employee or independent 
contractor. 
C. Connecticut 
Connecticut courts have also addressed similar issues pertaining to 
concurrent nondelegable duties, which the Afoa II court found to be 
entirely possible. In Gazo, the plaintiff filed suit after suffering bodily 
injury when he slipped and fell on an icy and snowy sidewalk in the city 
of Stamford, Connecticut.162 In his suit, the plaintiff alleged that Rednick 
and Chase Bank owed him a duty to keep the sidewalk clear of ice and 
snow and that their failure to do so caused his injuries.163 Chase Bank 
proceeded to file an apportionment complaint against Pierni, who was 
contracted to perform ice and snow removal services for Chase Bank.164 
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The court concluded that although Chase Bank had a nondelegable 
duty to keep its premises safe, the nondelegable duty doctrine does not 
preclude the plaintiff from being able to sue an independent contractor for 
its negligence.165 It is not a necessary implication of the nondelegable duty 
doctrine that the contractor to whom the performance of the duty has been 
assigned may not, under appropriate circumstances, also owe the same 
duty to an injured party by their breach.166 This case essentially holds that 
concurrent nondelegable duties are possible and consistent with the 
historical framework of the doctrine. Even though the performance of the 
duty had been delegated to Pierni, it was consistent with the nondelegable 
duty doctrine to hold both parties liable.167 The significance of the name 
of the doctrine appears to be overlooked by the court in making this point. 
Although there was a nondelegable duty, that duty is not exclusive and can 
be delegated to others who have comparable liability.168 
In Archambault, the court concluded that the proper analysis in 
asserting the nondelegable duty doctrine requires a finding of which entity 
was truly in control, and it may not always be the general contractor.169 
Although the general contractor, Konover, had overall responsibility for 
safety on the worksite—or he was the “controlling employer” under 
OSHA—that did not mean that he had an nondelegable duty to provide a 
safe worksite that precluded the jury from considering its subcontractor’s 
negligence.170 In a fact-sensitive analysis, the court noted that the evidence 
showed the general contractor did not retain direct work over the 
subcontractor’s work, over the subcontractor’s employees, or over the 
manner in which the work was to be performed. Further, the general 
contractor did not assume direct control over, or interfere with, the 
subcontractor’s responsibility to perform their work safely.171 Indeed, 
there was an explicit provision in the subcontractor agreement that the 
subcontractor “assumed the entire responsibility and liability for all work, 
supervision, labor and materials”172 and that it agreed to accept liability for 
any loss, damage, or destruction from any cause other than the general 
contractor’s sole negligence.173 Because of these facts, the court held that 
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the general contractor did not have a nondelegable duty to ensure a safe 
worksite, and both parties could be comparatively negligent.174 
Concurrent nondelegable duties make little sense when looking at the 
plain language of the name. While there can conceivably be a difference 
between a concurrent duty and delegated duty, the overlap is not distinct 
enough because of the relationship between the parties. When a general 
contractor, for example, hires an independent contractor, under the Gazo 
reasoning, the general contractor has delegated that duty and both parties 
now owe concurrent nondelegable duties. This appears to be a similar 
analysis that the Afoa II court used, but its clarity is nonetheless lacking 
because it ignores the significance that a general contractor owes a primary 
duty. 
In Archambault, while the court made a proper analysis of 
determining which party truly exerted a right of control over workplace 
safety, its result is distinguishable from Afoa because there is no indication 
of any contract provisions, or indemnification addendums, which would 
expressly delegate any such duty. As stated previously, absent such 
indemnification agreement, liability should flow to those who are in a 
position to control the actual implementation of safety standards in the 
workplace.175 The jury in Afoa expressly found that the Port retained 
control over EAGLE’s work, which gave rise to a nondelegable duty—
this should end the matter.176 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. The Nondelegable Duty Doctrine is Consistent with Principles of 
Agency Within Vicarious Liability and is Compatible with  
Washington’s Tort Reform Statute. 
The Washington Court of Appeals and the Afoa II dissent provide the 
most compelling analysis of the nondelegable duty doctrine and how it is 
consistent with vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is rooted in and arises 
from the same principles of agency principles; therefore, it is redundant to 
require the trier of fact to make an additional finding of agency. The 
defining element in the agency relationship is the principal’s right of 
control over the agent.177 As such, because the trier of fact found that the 
Port of Seattle exercised control over EAGLE, Afoa’s direct employer, its 
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nondelegable duty status should end the matter. A nondelegable duty, with 
an inherent finding of agency, is encompassed within the traditional joint 
and several liability situations retained in Revised Code of Washington 
section 4.22.070(1)(a).178 Therefore, the Port should have been found joint 
and severally liable for Afoa’s injuries. By requiring an additional jury 
finding of agency, the court has modified the long-standing nondelegable 
duty doctrine. 
Furthermore, concurrent nondelegable duties should not absolve the 
primary duty-holder from joint and several liability. The fact that there 
may be concurrent duties at a multiemployer worksite is unremarkable 
because the Port’s workplace safety duty is seen as prime or primary.179 
Because the Port is seen as the primary nondelegable duty-holder, 
allowing for comparative liability renders a delegation of its duty. If a 
nondelegable duty-holder is not entitled to delegate its duty, this 
delegation transcends logic. This is the essence of the majority’s 
understanding of concurrent liability which reaches absurd results in the 
context of the history and policy behind nondelegable duties. In addition, 
there was no express finding by the jury that the airlines retained control 
over EAGLE, so there is no support for the finding of its concurrent 
nondelegable duty. The jury only found that the Port had a nondelegable 
duty. However, even if it did make that finding, the Port’s prime 
nondelegable duty should require it to be joint and severally liable. As the 
dissent in Afoa II pointed out, the Port owed a common law and statutory 
specific duty to maintain workplace safety without regard to whether 
others at the worksite, including the airlines, also owed a duty.180 
B. Policy Implications of the Afoa II Holding 
While there are conflicting views on the impact of this litigation, if 
the Washington Court of Appeals holding had been upheld, a possible 
result would be that airports would be required to be constantly involved 
in all aspects of the operations of an airline’s contractors and 
subcontractors.181 While this could be viewed of as a negative and tedious 
consequence, in reality, this would be a positive, policy-driven outcome 
because it would result in the most care and attention to ensure workplace 
safety and WISHA compliance. 
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The implications for the Afoa II majority’s holding could possibly 
result in devastating consequences for workplace safety. The doctrine of 
nondelegable duties existed for decades based on the policy reason that the 
person or entity in the best position to prevent harm to its business invitees 
and workers—even independent contractors—should bear the burden of 
compensating for any harm. The policy behind the nondelegable duty 
doctrine incentivizes large employers to do everything within their power 
to ensure workplace safety. 
After Afoa II, a devastating consequence results: employers will no 
longer have this incentive. With this new rule in place, employers will not 
take their role in preventing workplace safety as seriously because it is 
now state law that they will not be jointly and severally liable absent an 
additional finding of agency. With no incentives in place backed up by 
current law, employers are likely to cut costs on workplace safety where 
they are able, distance themselves from subcontractors to avoid any 
possible finding of agency, and shift liability to the subcontractors. 
This will have a devastating residual effect on workplace safety and 
put the brunt of implementing workplace safety policy on those who lack 
the resources, power, and effectiveness to protect workers. Smaller 
independent contractors are the most likely to cut corners on safety, 
resulting in injury and death, and they are the most likely to be insolvent 
and fail to maintain liability insurance.182 Another possible outcome of this 
case is that large entities, such as the Port of Seattle and other large general 
contractors on construction sites, will reduce their safety activities because 
the less involved they are in protecting worker safety, the less exposure 
they have to a jury’s apportionment of responsibility.183 This possibility 
leads to a direct impact on workplace safety conditions. When the general 
contractor or jobsite owner is not held ultimately responsible for safety at 
its worksites, there is a very real possibility of “chaos ensu[ing]” because 
“[e]verybody does their own thing.”184 As noted in Seabright, the Afoa II 
majority’s holding “threatens an erosive effect on workplace safety.”185 
The Port of Seattle has the greatest resources to fully ensure 
workplace safety. It is the largest entity with the greatest ability to finance 
workplace safety measures, and it is the most likely to maintain its liability 
insurance. Consistent with previous findings of the purpose of the 
nondelegable duty doctrine, the Port should bear the primary responsibility 
for compliance with safety regulations because the general contractor’s 
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innate supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control over the 
workplace.186 
C. The Future of Washington State Post-Afoa II 
The majority in Afoa II completely changed the rule on nondelegable 
duties as it was known among Washington workers and employers. The 
majority’s harsh and perhaps inadvertent holding will have devastating 
consequences on injured workers, not least of whom was Brandon Afoa 
himself. While a simple holding conceivably resulted—that there must be 
an explicit finding of an agency relationship in order for there to be joint 
and several liability—jobsite owners will likely respond to this conclusion 
and change their control over jobsites. While in a perfect world safety is 
everyone’s priority, I am concerned that this holding will reduce incentives 
to control workplace safety measures, and it will distance jobsite owners 
from taking any actions that could result in a separate finding of agency. 
With the entity in the greatest position to ensure workplace safety taking 
steps backwards, a likely consequence will be increased workplace 
injuries. If a general contractor or property owner is able to seamlessly 
delegate such duties to subcontractors, less equipped entities will be tasked 
with greater responsibility. 
For now, the rule appears to be that in litigation with multiemployer 
worksites, injured plaintiffs should take care to identify every jobsite 
owner and independent contractor at every level and ensure the trier of fact 
explicitly finds an agency relationship between the nondelegable duty 
holder and any possible lower level contractor or employee involved. 
While the true impact of this holding is not yet known, advocates of 
workplace safety and supporters of injured workers should be attentive of 
any possible negative impacts on workplace safety, which may take form 
in a comparative analysis of how jobsite owners relinquish any control 
over workplace safety, any objective worsening of safety measures, and 
any documented increase in injuries on multiemployer worksites in the 
coming years. 
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